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Expert: Oil is rarely the cause of war

It is a misconception to talk about 'oil wars' and great powers going to war to secure energy supplies, says a professor of political science.

Two boys watch several ships on a hazy sea near the Strait of Hormuz.
The threat of closing the Strait of Hormuz, and the ability to actually do so, is Iran’s strongest card, according to Dag Harald Claes. Here, two boys are watching all the ships that are stuck in the strait.
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“We should draw a sharp distinction between oil as a cause of war and oil as an instrument in warfare,” says Dag Harald Claes.

He is a professor of political science at the University of Oslo and has researched oil, energy, and international politics for many years.

Claes has recently published a new book examining the role of energy and oil in wars and conflicts.

Oil has come to symbolise modern war and conflict, he explains.

“We easily slip into the idea that 'it’s all about oil' when we look at the US role in the Middle East, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and also Iran’s recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz,” says the political scientist.

Oil is a political and military tool

According to Claes, hardly any wars actually start because of oil.

What we do have many examples of is that oil and gas are used as tools to put pressure on the opponent, finance warfare, or as a tool of sanctions, he explains.

He points, among other things, to the oil embargo against the United States in 1973, which was meant to pressure the Americans into ending their support for Israel. He also refers to repeated past threats to close the Strait of Hormuz in order to force changes in US policy towards Iran.

“In such cases, oil is a political and military card, but it is not the actual cause of war,” he stresses.

He believes the same pattern continues today.

“The war in Ukraine is first and foremost about territory and state sovereignty. Putin will not accept a Ukraine that is an independent, Western-oriented state. Energy enters the picture as sanctions going both ways between Russia and the EU,” Claes explains.

He notes that Russia limited gas supplies to Europe before the attack in 2022.

After the attack, the EU cut imports from Russia. Europe has had to manage the loss of around 40 per cent of its former gas supply from Russia.

“But again, that gas is not the reason the war started,” he says.

The Strait of Hormuz – Iran’s strongest card

Particularly relevant today is the US use of force against Iran and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Dag Harald Claes points out that between 15 and 20 per cent of the world’s oil consumption normally passes through this strait every day, along with gas and other goods. The recent closure of the strait affected food prices, energy supplies, and industrial production globally.

Claes notes that the large oil reserves many oil-dependent countries have built up, and China’s rapid reduction in oil consumption, made the closure less dramatic than one might have expected.

“Even so, the explicit threat to close the Strait of Hormuz, and the ability to actually do so, is Iran’s strongest card,” says the energy researcher.

Previously, according to Claes, the United States believed it could reopen the strait militarily, even if Iran managed to close it for a short period. The experience of the war in Ukraine has changed that calculation.

Claes points out that Iran has acquired a new weapon: large numbers of drones modelled on those developed in Ukraine.

“These are small, relatively cheap, and difficult to defend against," he says.

Claes adds that when an ultra-large crude carrier can carry more than three million barrels of oil, each cargo represents values that no shipping company can afford to lose. As a result, the risk becomes enormous.

“If you hit an oil tanker, it burns. In that way, Hormuz becomes not only a geographical bottleneck, but a political and economic weapon,” he says.

The US is not dependent on energy from the Middle East

Claes also notes that the US energy situation is radically different from what it used to be.

“Since the shale oil revolution around 2008, the US has become a net exporter of both oil and gas,” he says.

At the same time, he reminds us that the US, despite what many believe, has never been heavily dependent on the Middle East for oil. Historically, much of US oil has come from close neighbours such as Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela.

“But the oil market is global and the price is set internationally. American motorists pay gasoline prices that reflect crises in Hormuz, regardless of where the oil physically comes from,” he explains.

When the gasoline price in the United States exceed certain thresholds – 'five dollars per gallon is a political red flag' – the distance between decisions made in Washington and everyday life at American gas stations becomes small, according to Claes.

“Then we see the chain that runs from a US presidential decision to bomb Iran, via Iran’s response in Hormuz, to the price voters pay to fill their tanks,” he says. stresses.

The sun and wind cannot be owned by individual states

Many countries in the world are in the process of transitioning to greener energy.

Claes is not sure the world will become less conflict-ridden simply because it becomes less dependent on fossil fuels. One reason is that wars and conflicts rarely begin because of energy resources.

Nevertheless, he sees some potential for less conflict if green energy becomes the world's primary energy source.

“Sun and wind are resources that no one can own in the same way as oil and gas. They exist to some extent everywhere and are often described as a 'free gift of nature.' When individual countries build up renewable energy systems and become more self-sufficient in electricity, they become less vulnerable to other suppliers cutting off supplies in a conflict,” says Claes.

He emphasises, however, that renewable energy can also be politicised.

“If one country or region develops large amounts of wind and solar power and becomes the main electricity supplier for others that have not 'done their homework' domestically, electricity can be used as leverage in much the same way that gas is used today,” he says.

The difference, according to Claes, lies in the degree of dependence.

“The more a country can cover its energy needs with its own resources, the harder it becomes for others to use energy as a weapon,” he says.

Reference:

Claes, D.H. Energy Politics in a Turbulent Era (Summary), Edward Elgar Publishing, 2025. ISBN: 978 1 03533 159 8

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